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Introduction
As we projected in a previous strategic analysis (Papadimitriou et al. 2004), the U.S. economy
experienced growth rates higher than 4 percent in 2004. The question we want to raise in this
strategic analysis is whether these rates will persist or come back down. We believe that several
signs point in the latter direction. In what follows, we analyze the evidence and explore the alter-
natives facing the U.S. economy.
On the side of households, heavy indebtedness is putting negative pressure on growth, and
debt-service ratios (interest and principal payments relative to income) are close to all-time
highs.As we will report later,debt-service burdens appear to have reached saturation levels.Since
interest rates are rising and will continue to do so,households face stark choices.If they continue
piling up new debt,the combination of their rising debt burdens and rising interest rates will pro-
duce rapidly increasing and unsustainable ratios of debt service to income. A jump in personal
bankruptcies and a sharp drop in consumer spending will be inevitable. On the other hand, if
households recognize that they cannot go much further in mortgaging their incomes to debt
service, they will begin to cut back on further borrowing and slow down their current spending.
We see the latter response as the more probable of the two. Furthermore, a new Washington and
Wall Street consensus, encompassing the view that it is important to increase personal saving, is
emerging in response to recent speeches by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, other
Federal Reserve governors, and administration officials.
The personal consumption spending machine, including household investment, again raced
ahead of personal income in December 2004, but its growth is unsustainable and likely to stabi-
lize or even fall in 2005, as we shall show later. With investment spending already growing more
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to Professor Papadimitriou at 845-758-7700.slowly, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP growth will almost cer-
tainly slow down.Nonmilitary factory orders were little changed
in November 2004, but durable goods orders, especially for
automobiles,registered a higher rate than in the previous month.
Still, concern is being expressed that the gain in consumption
spending cannot continue in light of weak average hourly and
weekly earnings increases of 2.7 percent and 3.3 percent,
respectively, over the past year. The former rise was less than
the increase in the consumer price index (CPI). The economy
received a strong jolt from greatly expanded budget deficits,and
as a result, GDP growth initially shot up. But in the absence of
further stimulus, a correction seems inevitable. President
Bush’s announced plan to cut spending in order to halve the
budget deficit by 2009 will almost certainly ensure that the
correction comes to pass. Indeed, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has just
recently reduced its forecast for U.S. growth for 2005 to 3.3 per-
cent, down from the 3.7 percent it predicted just six months ago
(Pakko 2005).Needless to say,this development has direct impli-
cations for employment prospects.
On the side of business spending (purchases of nonresi-
dential capital equipment and software), investment growth
has peaked and begun to decline. Investment is fueled mainly
by profitability, and the growth rate of real corporate profits
has recently been higher than a year ago. Industry analysts are
not at all sanguine that higher profits will continue. The growth
rate of real investment follows profits, usually with a lag. The
December 2004 increase in business activity, however, has been
attributed not to higher profits, but mainly to an inventory
buildup as well as the tax legislation of May 2003,which increased
the depreciation allowance for capital goods spending incurred
prior to January 1,2005.In general,however,instead of spending
their past profits, businesses are now accumulating them as cash:
over the six quarters from the beginning of 2003 to the middle of
2004,“nonfinancial corporations increased their liquid assets by
20 percent, to a record $1.3 trillion”(Bernasek 2004).
On the external economic front,the ever-increasing current
account balance—exports minus imports plus net inflows of
interest and certain other types of income—dominates all
other considerations. Relative to GDP, the current account was
in deficit to the tune of 4.4 percent in 2002,4.7 percent in 2003,
5.9 percent in the third quarter of 2004, and a new all-time
record in November 2004.This worsening of the current account
balance continued in spite of a fall in real exchange rates that
began two years ago. As we have noted in previous work
(Papadimitriou et al.2004),under existing conditions,the cur-
rent account deficit is bound to mirror the government budget
deficit,and the latter has expanded greatly in recent times.Even
the decline in real exchange rates could not halt the trend. We
expect real exchange rates to continue declining, a trend that
should help matters. The potential slowdown in domestic
growth should also help,since it slows domestic import demand.
But according to the OECD,the growth prospects of our major
trading partners—that is, Europe and Japan—are even worse
than our own. This would, of course, slow down our export
demand.The combination of these growth trends at home and
abroad is unlikely to lead to an improvement in our current
account deficit. Indeed, in the absence of other changes, we
expect our current account deficit to reach a record 6.1 percent
of GDP in 2005 and worsen after that.
In the present strategic analysis, we examine all of these
trends and their implications in greater detail.We also develop
scenarios depicting possible future patterns. This allows us to
find potential solutions to the problems facing the U.S. econ-
omy over the next few years.
Three Main Financial Balances
We begin with an examination of the latest trends in the finan-
cial balances of the private sector, government sector, and for-
eign (external) sector. Each sector balance represents a sector’s
receipts minus its nonfinancial expenditures; as a matter of
accounting, the balances of the private sector (households and
businesses) and the government sector must add up to that of
the foreign sector (the latter being the current account bal-
ance). Figure 1 charts the progress of these three critical bal-
ances. We can see that the private sector balance was negative
throughout the latter part of the 1990s, began moving back
into balance after 2000, was near zero by the end of 2003, and
turned negative again in 2004.
Figure 2 shows the underlying trends: a persistent deficit
in the personal (household and noncorporate business) sector
accounts that was more or less offset by a corresponding sur-
plus in corporate accounts for some time. In other words, an
excess of spending of the personal sector over its receipts was
just counterbalanced by the opposite situation in the corporate
sector.However,matters have changed in recent times,because
the personal sector balance has deteriorated once again, while
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the corporate sector balance has stabilized. Thus the private
sector as a whole has returned to a deficit status. The latest fig-
ures show that in the third quarter of 2004, the private sector
was running a financial deficit of about 1.7 percent of GDP, at
annual rates.
The progress of the private sector balance is particularly
important from our point of view.Over the last seven years,the
deficit of the private sector has been an important driving force
in the expansion of the U.S. economy. But it came at the price
of a rapid build-up of household debt (Figure 3). We argued
that the private sector would have to reduce its deficit, because
its debt build-up was unsustainable.Beginning in 2001,the pri-
vate sector deficit did indeed reverse itself and rapidly moved
back toward balance. But, as we foresaw, its expansionary con-
tribution began to decline correspondingly. Accordingly, we
argued that sustained growth required an expansion in govern-
ment spending in order to take up the slack.
1
This, too, came to
pass, at rates exceeding those we had thought possible, and in a
form far different from the expanded social spending we envi-
sioned. Nonetheless, the dramatic run-up in the budget deficit
served its purpose: it pushed up the growth rates of output,
profits, and, to a lesser extent, employment.
As we noted earlier,the matter has another side.The inter-
nal balance, that is, the sum of the private sector balance and
government balance, must equal the current account balance.
This means that when the private sector balance is close to zero,
the government deficit will be directly mirrored in the current
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account deficit, and an expansion in the former will be paral-
leled by an expansion in the latter. This, too, is clearly visible 
in Figure 1, which shows that the U.S. current account deficit
reached an estimated record of about 6.0 percent of GDP in
2004. The nearly continuous deterioration of the U.S. current
account is a structural phenomenon, the potentially dire con-
sequences of which have been given considerable attention by
our colleague Wynne Godley over the last decade. In recent
times, a growing number of studies have focused on the same
theme (Mann 2004; Roubini and Setser 2004; Obstfeld and
Rogoff 2004).Even Chairman Greenspan,who for a long while
believed in the ability of markets to deal with the problem, has
recently called for policies aimed at reducing the U.S. current
account deficit.
In what follows,we analyze the interactions of debt,deficits,
and growth in more detail,to try to sort out the prospects facing
the U.S. economy over the next few years. Our starting point is
the behavior of the private sector, particularly of households
and corporations. From there we move to the implications for
growth, and then for the U.S. current account deficit. Our last
step will then be to examine various economic scenarios facing
us, and to consider various policy alternatives.
Household Debt and Its Implications 
Despite strong economic growth in recent times,the finances of
the household sector have become increasingly fragile. Figure 4
depicts the extraordinary growth in household debt relative to
disposable income. In this, mortgage debt is clearly the culprit.
Household debt has risen partly in response to the increased
availability and aggressive marketing of various forms of credit,
and partly in response to a long-term fall in interest rates (Figure
5). As a consequence, debt-service burdens (interest and princi-
pal payments relative to income) have risen far less than have the
underlying debt burdens. Nonetheless, debt-service burdens are
close to all-time highs. Data on the various components of the
overall debt-service burden are not publicly available,but a Levy
Institute study separates out the overall debt burden into its
component parts (Dos Santos,Shaikh,and Zezza,forthcoming).
Figure 6,taken from this study,displays the debt-service burdens
arising from mortgage and revolving consumer debts (credit
cards,etc.),which are as high as they have been at any time in the
last quarter-century.On the other hand,the debt-service burden
of nonrevolving debt (auto, personal, and home equity loans)
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actually declined overall between 1980 and 2004. In effect, the
increased availability of mortgage finance, along with its lower
interest rates and far lower principal payments, made it an
attractive alternative to high-cost short-term loans.The interest-
ing consequence of this is that the sum of mortgage and nonre-
volving debt service has been fairly stable over the last 25 years
or so. It is in credit card and other similar revolving debt service
that the great increase has taken place.
Two sorts of patterns are evident in the foregoing charts.If
we look at the debt burdens (debt relative to income) in Figure
4, we see an accelerating trend with no end in sight. But if we
look at the debt-service burdens (principal and interest pay-
ments relative to income) in Figure 6, we find that these have
begun to reach a saturation point over the last couple of years.
The steady decline in interest rates shown in Figure 5 provides
the link between the two preceding patterns, that is, between
steadily rising household debt burdens and modestly rising or
even stable debt-service burdens.
But the era of falling interest rates is over for the foresee-
able future.On February 2,2005,the Federal Reserve raised the
federal funds rate (FFR) for the sixth consecutive time (to an
annual rate of 2.5 percent, up from 1 percent in June 2004).
And the Fed is expected to continue raising rates. Many com-
mentators have suggested that the neutral FFR is probably at 
4 percent. So the question becomes: what will be the probable
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effect of rising interest rates on household borrowing and
spending? To this question we turn next.
Baseline: Growth Fueled by Continued
Household Debt 
The first step is to construct what we call the baseline scenario.
The aim here is to derive the internal and current account bal-
ances of the economy for a given fiscal policy, under some plau-
sible assumptions about how households and businesses will
react to the expected increase in interest rates. We assume no
change in the current fiscal stance: real government expenditure
is expected to grow at 3 percent per year, keeping total govern-
ment outlays in line with the expected growth of the economy;we
expect tax rates to stay unchanged in the baseline, as the current
administration is likely not to increase them. While the first of
our assumptions is entirely compatible with the September 2004
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget projection (2004),
the latter is different.The difference stems from the CBO’s expec-
tation of an increase of 0.8 percent of GDP in revenues for 2005
and a further increase of 0.5 percent of GDP in 2006, mainly
coming from an increase in personal taxation (0.5 percent in
2005 and 2006) and smaller increases in corporate income and
social insurance taxes.The current administration has often post-
poned any such increases in tax rates,so our baseline is predicated
on the assumption that it will continue to do so.
The performance of the Levy Institute’s macro model
depends to some extent on growth in the rest of the world, and
on the behavior of relative prices both for exports and for
imports. Projections for growth in U.S. trading partners have
been taken from Global Insight (Stoppa 2004): our aggregate
measure for world growth, weighted according to each country’s
share of U.S. exports, is close to 3.4 percent in 2005, 3.3 percent
in 2006, and stable at 3.4 percent for the rest of the simulation
period.In our baseline,we also assume no further devaluation of
the dollar, following an estimated depreciation of 15 percent of
our broad U.S. dollar exchange rate index in the last quarter of
2004. Estimates of the impact of a continued depreciation of the
dollar are considered in Scenario 2. We assume that the recent
increases in oil prices will not imply higher inflation at home or
abroad, so our baseline does not assume any further shocks to
U.S. competitiveness. Finally, we assume that interest rates will
increase by 25 basis points for each quarter of 2005 (i.e.,1 percent
overall) and remain stable thereafter.6 Strategic Analysis, March 2005
Figure 7 displays the historical paths of new household and
business sector debt, as percentages of the income of the private
sector.
2We see that the household sector seems to have stabilized
its borrowing in the last quarters at about 2.3 percent of income
(quarterly), while the business sector, after a marked decline
starting in 2000, is now slowly increasing its borrowing rate.We
extrapolated these most recent trends in our baseline projection,
on the grounds that our projected increase in the interest rate
would not be large enough to precipitate any abrupt change in
the behavior of the personal and business sectors.
The baseline scenario examines the consequences of the
assumptions.Figure 8 depicts the effects on the three main bal-
ances. We find that the government deficit is stable, relative to
GDP, while the private sector as a whole continues to run a net
deficit approaching 1.8 percent of GDP by 2006. Moreover, the
resulting growth path for the economy is even more favorable
than that estimated by the CBO: GDP would grow 3.6 percent
in 2005, slow down a bit thereafter, and remain above 3 percent
for the rest of the simulation period.
The first problem with this scenario arises in the external
balance. In the face of the foregoing private and government
deficit spending patterns and the assumed modest increases in
interest rates (which exacerbate the outflow of interest pay-
ments to foreign creditors), the current account deficit would
rise to a record of 6.2 percent of GDP by 2005 and deteriorate
even further in the following years.
A second problem also surfaces, this time in the private sec-
tor, the deficit of which rises to about 1.8 percent of GDP 
by 2006. As a result, its debt burden keeps rising, from about 
174 percent of income in the third quarter of 2004 to about 
178 percent at the end of 2005 (due to a 3 percent increase in per-
sonal debt,offset by a 1 percent decrease in business debt,relative
to sectoral disposable income), and to about 187 percent by the
end of 2008.Combining these results with the assumed increases
in interest rates, we find that the household debt-service burden
would rise from its current record level of 13.3 percent to 14.7
percent by 2005,
3 and to about 16 percent by the end of 2008.
On the whole, the baseline scenario therefore represents an
unsustainable path: its salutary high growth rates would be
attended by record current account deficits and record levels of
household debt-service burdens.The former could precipitate a
dramatic flight from the dollar, while the latter would be likely
to lead either to a gradual cutback in household borrowing or a
sharp drop in the face of a wave of personal bankruptcies.In the
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next set of scenarios, we therefore consider some less extreme
possibilities. Scenario 1 will examine what happens if house-
holds strive instead to maintain the current debt-service ratios
in the face of rising interest rates. This would require them to
reduce their debt levels relative to GDP, by paying down their
existing debts rather than piling on new ones. Scenario 2 will,
in turn, focus on the current account balance, by assuming
that in addition, the exchange rate depreciates by yet another
20 percent by 2006.Scenario 3 will investigate the consequences
of policies aimed at sustaining business investment.
Scenario 1: Stabilizing Household Debt Service
In the present scenario, we consider what is likely to occur if
households begin to reduce their borrowing in the face of rising
interest rates, so as to keep their debt-service ratios from rising
beyond their current record levels.In our baseline scenario,and
in all subsequent ones, we assume that the Fed will raise inter-
est rates by 1 percent overall in 2005, and keep rates constant
thereafter. We assume that the effective interest rate (that paid
on existing debt) will react very slowly to any increases in the
FFR: under the assumption above,the effective interest rate will
remain unchanged during 2005, and start rising only from
2006,as the share of new debt contracted at higher interest rates
rises. In order to maintain a constant debt-service ratio, house-
holds will thus need to stabilize their debt-to-income ratio by
the end of 2005 and decrease it from 2006 onwards.
Our simulations of various alternative paths indicate that
because the personal debt-to-income ratio is already so high,
reducing this ratio by the required amount would decrease
household borrowing (relative to income) by 1.4 percent per
quarter over the year from the current level of 8 percent to
about 2.3 percent of disposable income.
Figure 9 reports the effects of this moderation in household
borrowing behavior on the main sectoral balances. The private
sector goes back into surplus, and the cutbacks in household
spending reduce import demand, so the current account balance
stabilizes at around 5 percent of GDP. But now the government
deficit increases to above 5.5 percent,because the assumed annual
rate of growth of government expenditures of 3 percent is now
greater than the rate of growth of GDP.Any effort to balance the
budget by reducing the growth in government spending would
only make GDP growth fall even further and unemployment rise
even more. Figure 10 shows that the cutbacks in household 8 Strategic Analysis, March 2005
debt-fueled expenditures would make GDP growth fall sub-
stantially,dropping to about 2 percent in 2005,then rising back
up to 2.5 percent in 2006, and above 3 percent thereafter.
Unemployment would in turn follow the path of GDP growth.
A moderation in household debt behavior therefore reduces
the problems of burgeoning household and external debt, but
only at the expense of accelerated government indebtedness,
slowed growth, and increased unemployment. Taken by itself,
this change in household behavior is clearly insufficient. In the
next scenario, we consider the additional beneficial effects of a
continued drop in value of the dollar.
Scenario 2: Consequences of a 
Continued Fall in the U.S. Dollar 
In Scenario 1, as in the baseline, we held the exchange rate sta-
ble at its current level, so as to identify the consequences of
other changes. But the exchange rate has been dropping for
some time, and is now down roughly 14 percent from its 2002
peak. Our simulations indicate that this has not had a signifi-
cant impact on the current account balance so far, for two rea-
sons.First,the growth rate of the U.S.economy has been higher
than that of its OECD trading partners, stimulating imports
relative to exports. And second, the other (principally Asian)
trading partners are increasingly competitive and have been
making great strides in the world market. There is also the
known fact that the U.S. marginal propensity to import, or the
proportion of income increases spent on imports, is much
higher than that of the rest of the world; the last trade report
shows that,despite the drop of the dollar,imports have increased
and exports decreased. In the present scenario, we consider the
consequences of a further fall in the U.S.dollar,in combination
with the previously analyzed change in household debt behav-
ior.We saw in the previous scenario that a reduction in house-
hold borrowing relative to income would reduce GDP growth,
which would in turn reduce the growth of import demand and
actually stabilize the current account deficit at a level of 5.4
percent of GDP.We now show that a further fall in the U.S.dol-
lar would help on two fronts: by stimulating exports relative to
imports,it would not only further improve the current account
balance but also enhance GDP growth.
In the next exercise (Scenario 2),we assume that the (broad
measure of the) dollar will fall by 2.5 percent per quarter over
2005 and 2006 (i.e., by roughly 20 percent overall in the next
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two years). This seems reasonable, given that the dollar has
fallen at an annual rate of 15.5 percent in the last quarter of 2004.
We then find that the current account deficit is reduced, falling
to 4.6 percent of GDP by 2006 (as shown in Figure 11). At the
same time,GDP growth itself is buoyed by the resulting increase
in net exports. In the previous scenario we found that reduced
household borrowing would cause the GDP growth rate to drop
to 2 percent in 2005 and then rise up to 2.5 percent in 2006
(Figure 10).With the added stimulus of the assumed drop in the
dollar, the GDP growth rate comes out somewhat higher, at 2.6
percent in 2005 and 3.6 percent in 2006 (Figure 10).
According to our model, a further devaluation of 10 per-
cent each of the next two years in the broad exchange rate of
the dollar translates into higher import prices, which grow
about 5 percent faster than in our baseline during the devalua-
tion, and falling export prices, so real imports decrease as a
share of GDP while exports accelerate.
The preceding scenario shows that a depreciation of the
U.S. dollar, in combination with moderated household debt
behavior, would reduce the U.S. current account deficit.
Furthermore, it shows that overall GDP growth would be lower
than its present level,falling from 4.3 percent in 2004 to 2.6 per-
cent in 2005 and 3.6 percent in 2006. Moreover, the sustained
fall in the dollar considered in the previous scenario is not with-
out risks.Commentators have noted that because foreigners are
increasingly concerned about a collapse of the dollar,they could
eventually demand higher interest rates on Treasury bonds toThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
compensate for exchange rate risk.Indeed,foreign capital inflows
to the United States have already slackened. A rise in interest
rates prompted by such events would further exacerbate the
household debt service burden, slow down business spending,
and increase the international outflow of income.
Hence, it is incumbent upon us to consider other policy
alternatives.Over the longer run,U.S.competitiveness could be
enhanced instead by a rise in U.S. export sector productivity
relative to that of its trading partners. This slower but more
fundamental path would offer the same benefits as a deprecia-
tion of the U.S. dollar, but with less risk. It would increase U.S.
competitiveness by structural means, shift domestic demand
from foreign goods to domestic goods,increase the growth rate
of exports, and halt the continuous increase of the country’s
foreign debt.Another effect,which could operate in the shorter
run,would be a renewed surge in business spending.This is the
scenario we take up next.
Scenario 3: The Effects of a Surge 
in Business Spending
We have found that the combination of more moderate borrow-
ing behavior and a moderate decline in the dollar would reduce
the current account deficit. But on balance it would also reduce
GDP growth and increase unemployment. Were the current
administration to implement its announced plan to halve the
government deficit, the growth rate of domestic demand would
fall even more, with further adverse effects on GDP growth.
4
Conversely,a surge in investment stimulated by policy ini-
tiatives would help matters significantly. Investment is driven
mainly by profitability, and retained earnings are by far the
major source of investment finance. Corporate profits have
recently been higher than previously expected,so there is some
possibility that investment could pick up. Given that business
debt has been stabilized (see Figure 3 above), it is plausible that
a surge in business investment could involve an increase in busi-
ness sector borrowing.Accordingly,in this scenario (Scenario 3),
we examine the consequences of a temporary increase in busi-
ness borrowing to its previous peak level in 1998. This would
raise the relative level of business debt only modestly, from its
current level of 65 percent of GDP, to 68 percent by the end of
2006, and reduce it thereafter.
Total private sector borrowing is now maintained at historic
levels,as in the baseline.But here this is accomplished by a reduc-
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tion in household borrowing, and hence in household debt and
debt-service burdens. The surge in overall private sector borrow-
ing once again raises GDP growth closer to the high levels
obtained in the baseline scenario,namely 3.2 percent in 2005 and
higher in subsequent years.But with the growth rate being higher
than in the preceding two scenarios, import growth is corre-
spondingly higher. The increase in imports is ameliorated some-
what by a shift in the composition of domestic demand away
from personal consumption towards business investment. As a
result, the current account deficit actually rises slightly at first
before falling to around 5 percent in 2006 and toward 4 percent
thereafter. (This outcome assumes that higher interest rates do
not add any additional burden to the trade deficit and that the
U.S.payments received from foreign assets are almost the same as
those it pays to foreigners, i.e., the status quo.) The government
deficit, on the other hand, hovers around 5 percent in 2005 and
afterward,as shown in Figure 12.What this scenario shows,most
of all, is that it is possible to maintain growth and employment
while avoiding both debt increases and foreign exchange crises.10 Strategic Analysis, March 2005
Conclusions
1. Personal debt is very high relative to income, making the
economy vulnerable to a rise in oil prices or interest rates.
2. President Bush’s announced plan to halve the deficit by
decreasing spending is inconsistent with a growth rate fast
enough to prevent unemployment from rising in 2005 and
beyond. Such growth could occur only if personal indebt-
edness were to continue to increase at an unsustainable
rate relative to income.This would almost certainly lead to
a growing current account deficit.
3. A continued devaluation of the dollar (10 percent in each of
the next two years) would stabilize the current account
deficit but only with a reduction in the growth rate of GDP
from the present level of more than 4 percent. On the other
hand, a downward trend in the value of the dollar could
conceivably prompt foreign investors to demand higher
interest rates to offset the fall in the value of government
securities. The rise in interest rates, in its turn, would exac-
erbate the household debt burden, slow down business
spending,and increase the international outflow of income.
4. Bolstering business investment by policy initiatives—for
example, reenacting the 50 percent tax allowance for pur-
chases of new capital goods (which expired in December
2004) and allowing U.S. companies to repatriate foreign
profits on favorable terms (a move recently made by
Congress)—could maintain growth and employment
while simultaneously preventing debt increases and for-
eign exchange crises.
Notes
1. See, for example, Papadimitriou et al. (2002).
2. The smooth lines have been obtained by applying a
Hodrick-Prescott filtering process with a smoothing
parameter of three (Kydland and Prescott 1990).
3. The rise in the household debt-service ratio would be
somewhat less if part of this debt were held at fixed inter-
est rates.
4. Papadimitriou et al. (2004) analyze the impact of fiscal
policy on U.S. medium-term prospects.
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